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THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION SECURITY PRACTICE 
Information security is not directly regulated in Australia and is instead subject to a 
patchwork of different legal and regulatory frameworks. How Australian information 
security practitioners construct and action information security therefore becomes 
important to the overall operation of a fragmented regulatory framework. How then do 
Australian information security practitioners understand information security and make 
compliance-oriented decisions? Our exploratory interview research examined how nine 
Australian information security practitioners understood and constructed their role as 
delegated regulators of organisational information security processes. Participants 
expressed a number of concerns that reveal a very different world to that traditionally 
portrayed as the discipline and practice of information security. We examine these concerns 
and discuss what they mean in the context of the Australian environment.  
 




Mark Burdon is a Senior Lecturer at the TC Beirne School of Law, The University of 
Queensland. 
Jodie Siganto is a collaborator on the Cyber Security Cartogaphies project led by Dr Lizzie 
Coles-Kemp, Royal Holloway University of London, which is part of the United Kingdom’s 
first Cyber Security Research Institute. 
Lizzie Coles-Kemp is a Senior Lecturer at the Information Security Group, Royal Holloway 
University 
 
Keywords: information security, data protection, data breaches, information security 
management. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information security, as a discipline, is portrayed as rational and control-oriented. The 
appropriateness of controls is derived through risk assessment frameworks that consider 
the contextual realities of the given organisation. In this paradigm, the role of the 
information security practitioner is to identify security risks that emerge and to design and 
implement appropriate controls. The practitioner then ensures those controls operate as 
expected and continue to address identified risks, as part of an iterative process. The 
implementation of information security therefore regards rational considerations that 
translate into actions that are accepted as reasonable by organisations. These organisations 
accept the value of information security as a self-serving good and one that has wider 
societal benefits from the broader minimisation of risks arising from security failures.1 
 
                                                
1 See e.g. Roger Clarke, 'The prospects of easier security for small organisations and consumers' (2015) 31(4) 
Computer Law & Security Review 538, 539. 
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It is therefore not surprising that a developing literature on practitioner perspectives is 
starting to develop.2 Such ‘human factors’3 or ‘human challenges’4 studies highlight the 
dissonance between, on the one hand, the theory of information security as a purely 
control-oriented approach, and on the other, the practice of information security which is 
negotiated and individually constructed.5 How practitioners construct and operationalise 
information security in practice is important to understand in order to assess the 
effectiveness of legal and regulatory application.  
 
In Australia, understanding the day-to-day lives of practitioners, and their perspectives on 
information security, and its management, is particularly important because of the legal 
and regulatory structure employed. Information security is not regulated directly by a 
governing piece of legislation. Instead, a patchwork of different laws, guidelines and 
regulations provide a principled range of security obligations for both private and public 
sector organisations. A broad regulatory framework underpins this patchwork of legal 
obligation which is predicated on principles-based regulation (PBR).6 In effect, the 
regulatory function is partly delegated from the regulator to the regulatee, in this case, the 
information security practitioner. As such, in a system of delegated regulation,7 such as in a 
PBR framework, it is vital to understand practitioner perspectives of information security 
and how core concepts of information security are being constructed and actioned by 
delegated regulatory actors. 
 
In this article, we report on findings from our exploratory interview research which 
examined how nine Australian information security practitioners understood and 
constructed their role as delegated regulators of organisational information security 
processes. Our findings reveal a very different world to that traditionally portrayed as the 
theory, discipline and practice of information security. Participants in our study had 
irregular working days and the ‘average day’ for all of our participants focused mostly on 
processes of interaction and negotiation. Definitions of information security also varied 
significantly which revealed a number of different understandings about the core 
                                                
2 See e.g. Eirik Albrechtsen, 'A qualitative study of users' view on information security' (2007) 26(4) Computers 
& Security 276; Eirik Albrechtsen and Jan Hovden, 'The information security digital divide between 
information security managers and users' (2009) 28(6) Computers & Security 476; Eirik Albrechtsen and Jan 
Hovden, 'Improving information security awareness and behaviour through dialogue, participation and 
collective reflection. An intervention study' (2010) 29(4) Computers & Security 432; Debi Ashenden, 
'Information Security management: A human challenge?' (2008) 13(4) Information Security Technical Report 195; 
Debi Ashenden and Angela Sasse, 'CISOs and organisational culture: Their own worst enemy?' (2013) 39(11) 
Computers & Security 396; Lizzie Coles-Kemp, 'Information security management: An entangled research 
challenge' (2009) 14(4) Information Security Technical Report 181. 
3 Human factors in this sense ofter refers to insider actors as threats. See Carl Colwill, 'Human factors in 
information security: The insider threat – Who can you trust these days?' (2009) 14(4) Information Security 
Technical Report 186. 
4 Ashenden more broadly refers to human challenges in relation to the complex actions of information 
security actors. See Debi Ashenden, 'Information Security management: A human challenge?' (2008) 13(4) 
Information Security Technical Report 195 
5 Gurpreet Dhillon and James Backhouse, 'Current directions in IS security research: towards socio-
organizational perspectives' (2001) 11(2) Information Systems Journal 127. 
6 See for an overview of PBR Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a Success of Principles-
Based Regulation' (2007) 1(4) Law and Financial Markets Review 191. 
7 See more broadly Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, 'Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals' (2003) 37(4) Law & Society Review 691. 
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constructs of information security, such as risk and risk assessment. Most importantly, 
compliance considerations also varied and it was clear that participants considered the 
application of law and regulation from different sources and in different ways. Our 
research therefore reveals a world and practice of information security that is not as 
ordered and structured as the control-oriented tradition of information security would have 
us believe.  
 
Section 2 briefly outlines the legal and regulatory framework for information security in 
Australia. Section 3 details the research methodology employed in the study and Section 4 
covers some key research findings. Section 5 provides some discussion in relation to what 
our study means for the legal and regulatory framework currently adopted in Australia 
and Section 6 concludes our article in relation to future directions.  
2. REGULATING INFORMATION SECURITY IN AUSTRALIA 
Information security in Australia is not directly regulated by a specific and governing piece 
of legislation that covers all public and private sectors. Government agencies are regulated 
by a range of both Commonwealth and state laws and guidelines. As a consequence, both 
federal and state governments have developed approaches to secure the information held 
in government-controlled systems. 
 
Australian federal government agencies are covered by a specially designed framework 
comprised of the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF)8 and the Information 
Security Manual (ISM).9 The ISM is based on a series of high-level principles which are 
supported by a detailed controls manual. The first principle is information security risk 
management, which supports agencies making informed, risk-based decisions specific to 
their unique environments, circumstances and risk appetite (subject to the implementation 
of a number of controls which are stated to be mandatory). In addition, there is a range of 
more technology-specific principles dealing with topics including product security, media 
security, software security, email security, network security and cryptography.10 
 
The Victorian Government in 2012 adopted the Commonwealth Government’s PSPF and 
ISM.11 Other state governments in Australia have adopted different approaches to ensuring 
                                                
8 The Commonwealth Attorney-General sets the Australian Government’s protective security policy and has 
released the Protective Security Policy Framework, in pursuance of that responsibility. Attorney-General's 
Department, 'Government Response to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Communications Report on the Inquiry into Cyber Crime ' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). See also 
Sharon Oded, Corporate Compliance New Approaches to Regulatory Enforcement ('Edward Elgar, 2013). 
9 The ISM is published by the Australian Signals Directorate pursuant to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 
(Cth). It is made up of a number of different publications. See Intelligence and Security Department of 
Defence, Australian Government Information Security Manual - Principles (2015); Intelligence and Security 
Department of Defence, 'Australian Government Information Security Manual - Controls' (2015) 
<http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Information_Security_Manual_2015_Controls.pdf>. 
10 Intelligence and Security Department of Defence, 'Australian Government Information Security Manual - 
Controls' (2015) <http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Information_Security_Manual_2015_Controls.pdf>, 
37 – 60. 
11 Victorian Government standards include Victorian Government CIO Council, 'Information Security 
Management Framework' (2014) <http://www.enterprisesolutions.vic.gov.au//wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/SEC-STD-01-Information-Security-Management-Framework.pdf>. 
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the security of the information that they hold, however, they all reference ISO 2700112 and 
ISO 2700213 (and its risk-based management system approach to information security) to 
some degree. The New South Wales Government has long supported compliance with ISO 
27001 and IS0 27002.14 The Queensland Government has re-issued a modified version of 
ISO 27001 as an ‘information standard.’15  
 
The situation regarding private sector coverage is more fragmented. Although there is little 
regulation, guidance has been issued by different regulators. The Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA), adopted a Prudential Practice Guide regarding the 
management of security risk in information and information technology.16 Similar to the 
ISM and the ISO 27001, APRA’s guide employs a risk-based approach to information 
security management, through the development of an IT security risk framework. The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) released a report in May 2015 
aimed at assisting organisations regulated by ASIC in their efforts to improve cyber 
resilience17 which report provides that regulated entities have ‘legal and compliance 
obligations’ that may require them to ‘review and update’ their cyber-risk management 
practices.18 This report recommends that consideration be given to the adoption of the NIST 
Cybersecuity Framework,19 as being of particular relevance to the particular regulated 
community.20 
 
The key information security legal obligation for private sector organisations,21 however, 
regards protections of personal information legislated by the Commonwealth Privacy Act.22 
Australian Privacy Principle 11.1 (APP 11.1) requires public and private sector entities to 
take reasonable steps to protect personal information from misuse, interference and loss, as 
well as unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.23 This broad legislative principle is 
supplemented by guidance provided by the Australian Privacy Commissioner in the Guide 
                                                
12 International Standards Organisation, ISO/IEC: 27001: 2013 Information technology – Security Techniques – 
Information security management systems- Requirements (2013) (‘ISO 27001’). 
13 International Standards Organisation, ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology – Security Techniques – Code 
of Practice for Information Security Management (2013) (‘ISO 27002’). 
14 NSW Government, 'Digital Information Security Policy' (2012) 
<http://arp.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/Digital_Information_Security_Policy_2012.pdf>. 
15 Queensland Government Chief Information Office, 'Information Security - IS18' (2015) 
<http://www.qgcio.qld.gov.au/products/qgea-documents/549-information-security/2704-information-
security-is18policy>. 
16 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 'PPG 234 – Management of security risk in information and 
information technology' (2010) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/PPG_PPG234_MSRIT_012010_v7.pdf> 
17 Australian Securities and Investments Commission ‘Report 429: Cyber Resilience’ (2015).  
18 Ibid, 7. 
19 National Institute for Standards and Technology, ‘Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity Version 1.0’ (2014) <http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-
021214-final.pdf>. 
20 Above n. 7, 32. 
21 It should be noted that not all private section organisations are regulated by the Privacy Act. Small 
businesses, for example, organisations with an annual turnover of less than $3 million per year are exempt 
from the Act. See Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6C. 
22 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
23 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Sch. 1 Sub-cl. 11.1. 
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to Securing Personal Information.24 The Guide provides guidance on the reasonable steps 
entities are required to take in order to be compliant with APP 11.1. However, ultimate 
compliance with APP 11.1 is a matter of interpretation and implementation by the 
regulated entity. The choice, design, construction and implementation of regulatory 
measures are therefore delegated to the regulated entity. Thus, at least the partial 
responsibility for developing inter and intra-organisational regulatory measures is 
delegated to information security managers and officers. 
 
APP 11, and the guidelines highlighted above, are representative of a PBR framework 
which is at the heart of regulatory and legal development in this area. In introducing a 
privacy regime based on the OECD Privacy Guidelines,25 the Australian Government 
accepted a principle-based regulatory model for the protection of personal information in 
Australia.26 PBR was confirmed as the appropriate regulatory model for privacy on the 
introduction of the private sector provisions in 200027 and as part of the review by the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner in 2005.28 PBR was confirmed again by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its voluminous review of privacy law, which 
concluded in 2008, and resulted in the ALRC providing specific consideration to the issue.29 
Most recently, the Australian Government has recently referred to PBR generally as a type 
of ‘light touch regulation’, noting the benefits it provides through allowing maximum 
flexibility among the regulated community regarding how they achieve compliance.30 
 
PBR requires the use of broad-based principles to achieve desired regulatory objectives. In 
legal frameworks of this type, the use of general principles can be distinguished from the 
employment of ‘bright-line’ and more complex and detailed rules.31 A ‘bright line’ rule 
contains a single criterion of applicability. Their simplicity means bright line rules are 
straightforward and so easier to understand and apply than principles; however, they are 
susceptible to gaming and ‘creative’ compliance. The specificity of the rule means it may 
not be broad enough to capture all of the conduct that it is aimed at. Alternatively, an 
organisation may ‘comply with the letter, but not the spirit, of the rule.’32 A complex or 
detailed rule can provide a higher degree of certainty by providing greater detail about 
what is required for compliance. However, the greater degree of specificity means that 
                                                
24 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 'Guide to securing personal information' (2015) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-to-securing-personal-information>. 
For a critique of the Guide’s foundational base see Roger Clarke, 'The prospects of easier security for small 
organisations and consumers' (2015) 31(4) Computer Law & Security Review 538, 545. 
25 OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Information (1980). 
26 Australian Law Reform Commission, 'For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice' (2008), [2.4], 
[18.24]. 
27 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 November 2000, 22370 (D Williams, 
Attorney-General). 
28 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 'Getting in on the Act: The Review of the Private Sector Provisions of the 
Privacy Act 1988' (2005) (‘Getting in on the Act’). 
29 See Australian Law Reform Commission, above n. 26, Chapter 4.  
30 Australian Government, 'The Australian Government Guide to Regulation' (2014) 
<http://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/australian_government_guide_regulati
on.pdf>, 28. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, 'above n.26, [18.35].  
31 Julia Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2007) 10. 
32 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n. 26, [18.28]. 
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these rules are even more susceptible to manipulation and creative compliance than bright 
line rules.33 
 
In comparison, a ‘principle’ articulates substantive objectives rather than specific 
compliance requirements.34 The perceived benefits of principle-based regulation include 
being less susceptible to gaming and a ‘tick box’ compliance approach. Principles give firms 
‘increased flexibility to decide more often … what business processes and controls they 
should operate.’35 It is believed that the devolution to the regulated community of the 
interpretation of compliance obligations will result in an industry that deals with 
regulatory issues in a more effective and efficient way. Principles are also seen as more 
flexible than prescriptive rules and therefore more durable in a rapidly changing 
environment.36 It is this durability aspect that was stressed by the ALRC in its review of the 
appropriateness of the principle-based regulatory scheme, particularly when considering 
the challenges posed by new technology.37  
 
The role of the regulator, in this case, primarily, the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC), and the methods they use to engage with the regulated community 
to ensure compliance are important to PBR. One of the assumptions supporting principle-
based regulatory theory is that the market is self-correcting and that responsible 
organisational management will ensure the adoption of appropriate systems and processes 
to meet the outcomes stated in the principles.38 However, to ensure that the market 
operates in the expected way, there must be a close engagement between the regulator and 
the regulated in which regulatory goals are clearly communicated.39 Hence the importance 
of regulatory guidelines to the operationalisation of information security practice in 
Australia.40 
 
Black underlines the importance of close engagement between the regulator and the 
regulated community, referring to the need for a dense network of ‘regulatory 
conversations’ between the regulator and the regulated regarding the purpose and 
application of the principle, where the outcome is structured around the goal that the 
principle is trying to achieve.41 Black notes that principles give the regulated more 
discretion in what they do, so that responsibility for ensuring that the objectives of the 
principles are met is shifted in part from the regulator to the regulated.42 According to 
Black, this involves ‘a significant shift in responsibility to firms and requires a substantially 
different set of skills on the part of inspectors and compliance staff to engage in the 
                                                
33 Ibid [18.30]. 
34 Ibid [18.29]. 
35 Financial Services Authority U.K., Principles Based Regulation: Focusing on the Outcomes that Matter (2007) 6 – 
7. 
36 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n. 26, [18.55]. 
37 Ibid, 235. 
38 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 302–303. 
39 Julia Black, 'Forms and paradoxes of principles-based regulation' (2008) 3(4) Capital Markets Law Journal 425. 
40 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n. 26 [4-59].  
41 Julia Black, 'The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation' (2010), LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 
17/2010,  6. 
42 Ibid 7. 
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negotiations and qualitative judgement that are entailed.’43 The shift in responsibility also 
involves a conscious and deliberate focus by the regulator on the firm’s internal systems of 
management and controls.44  
 
Finally, Black referred to the importance of regulators managing the greater interpretive 
risk for firms that arise from the use of principles, and minimising the effects of this risk 
through its enforcement approach.45 Black’s view was that if a regulator were to take a take 
a punitive approach to every minor infraction it would lead to a demand for rules. 
Enforcement therefore ‘has to be responsive to the firm's own attitude and behaviour’ and 
focus on outcomes.46 In other words, PBR requires a closely engaged regulator using a 
responsive enforcement approach to achieve clearly communicated outcomes and goals as 
part of a two-way conversation, while focusing on the operation of organisational 
management systems and controls. 
 
The key feature of PBR consequently involves delegation of traditional regulatory functions 
to the regulated entity. PBR therefore assumes that the regulated entity is best placed to 
understand its own environmental context and to meet principles-based statutory 
outcomes by being able to develop innovative forms of compliance that effectively manage 
the risks arising for the entity. Success of any PBR scheme is dependent upon a transfer of 
trust from the regulator to the regulated entity in the hope that the latter will have the 
competence and responsibility to self-observe and to regulate itself appropriately. This 
transfer of trust is ultimately likely to make its way through organisational hierarchies and 
eventually reside on the shoulders of information security practitioners. If practitioners do 
indeed bear the weight of delegated regulation then how practitioners construct, 
understand and action the practice of information security becomes important because the 
delegation of the regulatory function will be understood from the practice perspectives of 
practitioners. As such, a practitioner’s ‘average day’ and the effectiveness of delegated 
responsibility are intimately linked.  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our research findings are based on nine semi-structured interviews with individual 
information security practitioners. The nine interviewees were selected using convenience 
sampling47 and from individuals who volunteered in response to a request for participants 
posted to the Australian Information Security Association (AISA) LinkedIn group. No 
attempt was made to select interviewees to reflect a representative group of practitioners 
based on national coverage or type of role. However, we did attempt to interview persons 
from different types of organisation and different industrial sectors to examine whether 
these factors had an impact on how information security is constructed by practitioners.  
 
Although the specific job title and role specification of each practitioner differed, all 
interviews nevertheless identified themselves as information security practitioners. The 
                                                
43 Ibid 8. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 6 -7. 
46 Ibid 7-8. 
47 The first interviewees were known personally to the second author and these interviewees were further 
asked about other interviewees who would be interested in participating in the research.  
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interviewees included two females and seven males and were aged from their mid-30s to 
early 60s. Participants and details of their employees were anonymised to further 
encourage an open dialogue. Participants A to E were employed and interviewed in 
Brisbane and participants F to I were employed and interviewed in Melbourne. Four of the 
participants were Australian citizens and the remainder of participants were born in either 
continental Europe or the United Kingdom or Ireland. Again, we did not specifically recruit 
participants from different nationalities but we were interested in examining whether a 
participant’s place of birth or education had an influence in terms of their construct of 
information security.48 Similarly, participants were recruited from a range of industrial 
sectors including security consultants.  
 
Interviews with participants varied in length from 60 minutes up to 90 minutes. Each 
interview was semi-structured, with each interviewee being asked to respond to a series of 
questions, supported by loosely constructed prompts, regarding a description of their role 
and an average recent day at work; how the participants communicated; the relationships 
they had in place; their view of trust; their definition of information security; their 
understanding of their compliance obligations; concerns about information security and 
things they liked about information security. The interviews were then transcribed 
verbatim and examined in Nvivo to identify recurring themes utilising a general inductive 
approach for analysing qualitative evaluation data.49 
 
During the interview, each participant was asked to describe what they did, and were 
asked to consider a particular day (e.g. last Thursday) and describe to us what they did on 
that day. Participants also provided further descriptions about their everyday life in 
response to other questions posed by the interviewers, particularly those about 
interpersonal communications and relationships. This narrative approach enabled us to 
view the ‘every day’ standpoint of the information security practitioner from a number of 
different perspectives. It also assisted us to identify those themes upon which most or all of 
the participants agreed and allowed an insight into shared experiences and situations that 
could often be viewed as fragmented and ambiguous.50 This aspect was important to our 
research because we wanted to identify the constructs of information security being 
generated, how those constructs were being influenced by the ‘everyday’ existence and the 
extent to which these aspects influenced constructs of compliance.  
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Research findings from the study indicate that the participants’ daily, working lives require 
quite different considerations to the control-oriented foundations of traditional perspectives 
of information security. The ‘average day’ for the participants was generally described as 
complex and one that involves numerous parties, spread over different teams and in 
                                                
48 Although this artice does not consider the impact of geography and background on participants, further 
research is being conducted which will contrast the experience of information security practitoners in 
different geographical locations. 
49 David R. Thomas, 'A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data' (2006) 27(2) 
American Journal of Evaluation 237. 
50 See Anne-Marie Søderberg, 'Sensegiving and sensemaking in an integration process: A narrative approach 
to the study of an international acquisition in Czarniawska and Gagliardi (eds.), Narratives We Organize By 
(John Benjamins, 2003). 
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different organisations. The participants’ tended to describe the management of 
information security in their organisations as processes of negotiation rather than 
implementations of controls. The unpredictability of working days and environments may 
also have impacted on constructions of information security. Surprisingly, when asked 
about their definition of information security, the participants tended to provide us with 
different considerations. A similar situation arose when participants were asked to consider 
what ‘risk’ meant to them and how risk assessments operated in their organisation. Given 
the diffusion of responses, it became clear that different constructs of compliance were also 
in operation and that there was not really a core legal consideration that guided compliance 
oriented actions. We consider these points in more depth below.  
4.1 UNPREDICTABLE DAYS AND ROLES 
The nine interviewees held a range of jobs with varying job titles and descriptions. Three 
interviewees were independent consultants, while the rest worked in different capacities 
for a range of different types of organisations. Three of the non-consultant interviewees had 
responsibility for teams, one being a project manager and another being project security 
lead. One of the other interviewees had a similar role, acting as the information security 
expert adviser in regard to a particular project. 
 
Some work has been done on establishing job profiles for workers in IT security, and using 
these profiles as the basis for a common understanding of and lexicon for cybersecurity 
work.51 The intent of frameworks such as the U.S. Cybersecurity Workforce Framework is 
to describe cybersecurity work ‘regardless of organizational structures, job titles, or other 
potentially idiosyncratic conventions.’52 The US recognises that the creation of consistent 
definitions for the cybersecurity population ‘using standardized terms is an essential step 
in ensuring that our country is able to educate, recruit, train, develop, and retain a highly-
qualified workforce.’53 The European Committee for Standardization has developed a 
similar framework which includes 23 job profiles in six areas of IT security: business 
management, technical management, design, development, service and operations, and 
support. These jobs also cluster into five segments, each driven by an action verb: manage, 
plan, build, run, and enable.54 
 
                                                
51 See, for example, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, 'National Cybersecurity Workforce 
Framework 2.0' (2014) <http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/framework/>. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The EU framework is referred to in Frost & Sullivan, 'Critical Times Demand Critical Skills: An analysis of 
the skills gap in information security' (2013) 
<https://www.isc2cares.org/uploadedFiles/wwwisc2caresorg/Content/GISWS/GISWS-Skills-Gap-
Analysis.pdf>, 2 which is based on the Global Information Security Workforce study, undertaken by Frost & 




Figure 1: EU Committee for Standardisation Framework for IT Security 
 
The roles of seven of the nine interviewees fit into the above framework (albeit clustered in 
the ‘Business Management’ and ‘Plan’ domains). However, there were a number of 
participants who do not seem to fit so neatly.  
 
Two of the interviewees described their role as including responsibility for “governance, 
risk and compliance” and one was responsible for a team called “risk, security and 
compliance.” The EU Framework makes no specific reference to governance or assurance, 
although again these functions might be assumed to be part of the business management 
function. Similarly, the EU framework makes no reference to compliance, other than 
perhaps through the reference to ‘Quality Assurance Manager.’55 These omissions could be 
a reflection of the framework having been developed for IT Security rather than 
information security. However, it is also worth noting that two of the interviewees who 
described their role as including responsibility for “governance, risk and compliance’ made 
few reference to governance or compliance when discussing their every-days. This 
potentially points to the skills needed for this type of role being more fundamental than 
knowledge or technical skills with negotiation, conflict management and communications 
skills being key.  
 
When asked to describe their day, a number of interviewees were keen to refer to their 
diaries or time sheets to help them recall what they had done on the day they had elected to 
describe. However, most were able to talk about a standard day without prompts. 
 
Although all regarded themselves as information security practitioners, each of the 
interviewees described quite different “average days.” It is interesting to note that the skills 
used in the typical every-day relate to communication skills, planning skills, relationship 
management skills and negotiation skills. These skills are not traditionally taught as part of 
an IT/IS training.  
 
                                                
55 These roles seem to fit more neatly into the NICE Draft Cybersecurity Workforce Framework 2.0 which 
includes a domain called ‘Oversee and Govern’ which includes roles such as risk management, security 
program management, strategic planning and policy development. 
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The most consistent narratives were provided by the consultants who referred to tasks such 
as ‘trying to ask the right questions to tease out the information to support whether they 
meet the intent of that standard’ with a view to ‘understand and ascertain their compliance 
with the particular controls within the standard.’ The interviewees who held manager 
positions within end user organisations described days where the focus was on interacting 
with their own teams, with the occasional reference to interactions with other parts of the 
business. This is consistent with their role as managers and being responsible for teams. 
Two of these interviewees had new teams and both were spending time to develop their 
own people. C referred to the need to set priorities for his team as there were many 
challenges that needed to be addressed and ‘it was very easy to be drawn in to a big new 
task.’  
 
As managers, these interviewees also described a greater number of different tasks as part 
of their average day than the consultant interviewees. For example, C’s description of his 
day included strategic planning meetings with his own team, preparing for the next project 
governance board meeting, a number of meetings on the delivery of a new system and 
developing a briefing paper on cloud. He also had meetings with his own team to make 
sure they were on track. C commented ‘I don’t have many typical days; each day is pretty 
different to the next.’ 
 
It might be assumed that those with project team roles would have similar roles. However, 
again the three members of the group who might loosely be regarded as the security project 
team members were quite different in their every-days.  
 
One project team member described his typical day (and his job) as ‘making sure people 
know what I know, as soon as possible.’ He gave a succinct summary of the object of his job 
which was to guide business and technology projects through a life cycle and to ensure 
that: 
 
[T]he security requirements are adequately catered for, designed for and then 
assessed properly at the end and any residual risks are signed off by the 
appropriate people with the appropriate authority.  
 
Another project team member described an average day that had a clear overall outcome 
but with very limited interaction with other team members. It involved obtaining and 
reviewing documentation and developing a system security plan for security certification 
and accreditation purposes. At times there was interaction with other people, such as the 
involvement of other security people in risk assessment, or verifying positions with the 
audit team, but this seemed to be limited. It should be noted that this was probably 
reflective of the stage of the project, which was still very much at the design and 
documentation part of the cycle.  
4.2 DIFFUSE CONSTRUCTS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
In response to the question about how they defined information security, we expected 
participants to largely support the commonly used definition of information security 
found, for example, in ISO 27001, namely, ‘the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and 
 12 
availability of information’ (‘CI&A’).56 A number of the participants did define security in 
these terms, but also added some qualification, referring to CI&A as ‘the old classic’ or the 
‘textbook’ definition. Most commonly, information security was defined in terms of 
protection: protecting assets (both physical and digital) or protecting against unauthorised 
access. This could be argued as representing a data protection perspective on information 
security.  
 
However, a number of the participants took a more subjective definition of information 
security. Rather than being about the protection of assets, for them, information security 
was more a way of being. B talked about information security as ‘a way of life’ that requires 
vigilant maintenance ‘like milk in the fridge.’ For A, information security was about ‘doing 
the right thing’ to minimise potential harms that can arise from security failings. In A’s 
view his role as information security practitioner was to enable information and technology 
to be used for a good purpose, rather than stopping people doing things: ‘as a profession 
we are now coming to the point where we have to add value, not prevent value.’ This could 
be argued as representing an enablement perspective on information security.  
 
A number of participants referred to the way that information security had changed over 
time. It was clear that a number of the participants believed that the change in the 
environment in which they operated provided at least part of the explanation as to why it 
was so difficult to provide a single universal definition of information security or why the 
traditional definition of CI&A may longer be appropriate.  
 
One participant referred to information security as ‘in the past’ being about the protection 
of assets but now being about protecting services, because ‘more things run now as 
services,’ which means that information security is now much broader than it has been in 
the past. E, a consultant, who has worked in information security for over 20 years referred 
to the changing technological world and its effect on her concept of information security. 
When she first started working in security ‘there was a closed environment’ which meant 
that security was an internal issue which could be managed by the organisation itself. Now, 
security is ‘looking at the whole wide world’ and the issues for security were different to 
those which previously were developed and applied to the organisation’s controlled 
environment. This interpretation reveals how information security has, for some, moved 
from being focused on protection to be being focused on enabling an 
organisation/individual to do something. It is a move from a more closed or negative 
“protection from” to a more positive or open “ability to”. The skills and the capabilities that 
information security practitioners now need must reflect this more open position.  
 
Similarly, G highlighted ‘a real shift’ caused by the Internet and new technology which has 
forced the information security discipline out of the world where it controlled the assets by 
‘keeping something locked away’ and moved into a new world where information security 
is about ensuring that information ‘gets used in the right way.’ Participant I, another 
information security veteran, talked about how security had been seen as ‘something in the 
                                                
56 See Harold F. Tipton and Micki. Krause, Information security management handbook (Auerbach Publications, 
6th ed. 2007). 
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background’ where there was no relationship with the business. Over time security moved 
‘out of the basement to become a much more business focused, business related area.’’57  
 
The idea that information security is now a much broader field was reflected in comments 
about the range of people now forming part of the information security community. In G’s 
view the information security community, now extends beyond people who might call 
themselves information security practitioners and includes regulators and lawyers. For H, 
the information security community was ‘all these people that now are doing things who 
have a stake in what you're doing or a requirement for your expertise.’ 
 
These findings, as to the changing and expanding nature of information security and what 
that means for information security practitioners, are important for a number of reasons. 
They indicate that the ‘classic’ definition of information security which underpins the 
standard approaches to information security may no longer be appropriate and that we 
need to re-conceptualise what information security has become. The findings also highlight 
how the change in the IT environment has moved information security from something that 
was controllable in the sense of the very clear boundaries around the IT infrastructure and 
the human interface with that infrastructure to something that is no longer controllable and 
which includes a far wider range of players. 
4.3 NEGOTIATING RISK 
All of the participants referred to risk and the use of risk in supporting the selection of 
security controls.  
  
D saw risk and the discussion of risk with the business as a fundamental part of his role as 
an information security manager. In his view, his role was to help the business identify risk 
and then discuss the risk mitigation actions that could be put in place to deliver the solution 
in a secure way. Participant I thought risk was the best method of communicating the 
importance of security in a way that made sense to the business. For Participant I, risk 
made security more tangible to the business because ‘you can get empirical evidence about 
threats and vulnerabilities and exposures and impacts.’ 
 
C worked for a large government organisation which had a well-established risk 
framework that allowed it to respond readily to risks such as natural disasters. C referred 
to the way his team would advise business of the security risks and then recommend 
actions to reduce the risks and then get the project or business owner to sign-off on the 
residual risk or agreement on treatment plans. As part of this process, the business would 
want to reduce the security team’s assessment of the level of risk and not pay for the 
recommended risk treatments: ‘They're not prepared to take those risks. But they don't 
want to fund the mitigations to them either.’ 
 
Risk, and its reliance on the need to protect assets from possible threats, may not be the 
only language that should be used by practitioners when talking about security with their 
stakeholders This is particularly the case where the need for information security comes 
                                                
57 The transition from information system focused security to business security has been noted in the 
literature. See e.g. Basie von Solms and Rossouw von Solms, 'From information security to…business 
security?' (2005) 24(4) Computers & Security 271. 
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into conflict with other organisational values, such as speed to market or cost savings. It in 
these situations of conflict that the practitioners’ reliance on information security risk to 
support their position, or to ‘concretise’ the security issue seemed most problematic.  
 
A number of the participants did not think that risk made security real or ‘tangible’ for the 
business. For some, couching the information security conversation in terms of profit 
(rather than risk) was a way of making the issue ‘real.’ According to one participant: 
 
There’s no point in talking about hackers and breaches and weird and 
wonderful things that Hollywood portray to the CEO who really just cares 
about how he is going to make a profit next month.  
 
However, the methods of “concretising” information security are fairly limited, indicating 
that further work could be done to visualise the different dimensions of information 
security.  
 
The experience of many of the practitioners suggests that, in some cases, information 
security decisions may involve a contest that requires a much deeper understanding by 
information security practitioners of other organisational forces (such as politics) and the 
competing values that may underpin both information security and organisational 
decision-making and a more meaningful way to prioritise information security in 
management’s agenda than the language of risk and the threat scenarios typically relied 
on.58 
 
4.4 COMPLEX COMPLIANCE 
A series of questions were asked around the regulatory frameworks applicable to the 
participants being interviewed. These questions included what legal obligations they 
needed to comply with and what benchmark they used to determine security the level of 
security required as part of their information security role. 
 
There were no legal obligations that all of the participants universally regarded as being 
applicable to them in their daily work. 
 
A small number of the participants referred to Privacy Act obligations. Although aware of 
the Privacy Act and understanding the requirements around it, A did not believe he was 
legally obliged to disclose any breach of that Act that he might uncover as a consultant. In 
his view, in his role as ‘a trusted adviser’ to his client he would raise a privacy issue with 
his client first and then work through it with them. By contrast, if he found evidence of 
fraud or paedophilia he would go straight to the CEO of his organisation and make a phone 
call with him to the authorities.  
 
Participant E referred to compliance with US legislation that applied to her project but did 
not believe there was any other relevant legislation. I, who worked in the 
                                                
58 See also Debi Ashenden and Angela Sasse, 'CISOs and organisational culture: Their own worst enemy?' 
(2013) 39 Computers & Security 396 regarding the different discourses of information security from a CISO 
perspective and compliance as a ‘driver’ for information security.  
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telecommunications area, referred to regulations specific to telecommunication providers, 
which he described as ‘not that prescriptive in terms of the security side of it.’  
 
Similarly, there was no single benchmark referred to by all the participants, although a 
number referred to common standards, such as ISO 27001, PCI DSS and the Australian 
Information Security Manual (ISM).  
 
For A, his benchmark for information security compliance is PCI DSS, which he believes is 
“pitched at about the right level in terms of its verboseness, its technical detail” although 
for those for do not understand “it becomes very overwhelming.” Participant I referred to 
‘good sound practice’ based on ISO 27001 and the ISM. He regarded these standards as not 
‘going over the top’, and putting ‘loads of controls in place’ from a good corporate business 
practice point of view to ‘give us a sound foundation for going forward from here.’ E, 
working on a government project, had to comply with government standards and the ISM.  
 
Another interviewee referred to a list of controls that ‘you have in your head,’ which he 
applied based on ‘a judgment on how strong the control needs to be that you apply given 
the risks that you are facing.’ H, who was in charge of a security operations centre, based 
security around metrics and a General Quality Management approach, asking questions 
like How much did it cost? What was the impact to the business? What was the time the 
business lost?  
 
A number of participants saw standards as guides rather than prescriptive requirements. C 
said that standards give a general intent or ‘vibe’ rather than a prescriptive list of what the 
organisation can or cannot do. E referred to government standards and the ISM as 
‘minimum mandatory requirements.’ If there was an opportunity to increase security then 
she would ‘if it's within the scope of what we are doing and it's not going to cost a lot of 
money.’ 
 
For C, standards were not about providing a benchmark but about achieving better security 
as the outcome of process improvements. C was one of the only interviewees to explicitly 
refer to the importance of the continuous process improvement model which, together with 
risk, underpin ISO 27001 and other similar approaches to security (such as that adopted in 
the Australian Information Security Manual). 
 
Only one of the interviewees referred to the Australian Privacy Commissioner’s Guide to 
Security.59  
 
A number of interviewees made the point that being compliant or being certified as 
compliant with a standard did not necessarily mean that an organisation was secure. For 
example, C referred to an assessment done of another organisation which ‘had all the 
certifications’ but which had security he described as ‘appalling.’ In his view, the 
organisation had ‘fooled the compliance auditor’ and taken a ‘compliance journey’ that 
‘achieved nothing.’ B said that while compliance with standards may give a level of 
confidence you can still be vulnerable. For another interviewee, it was clear that 
‘compliance’ was at a lower level than ‘security’ and more about ‘ticking the box.’ He said: 
                                                
59 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, above n 24. 
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‘People believe they want security and when they understand that they have a fair amount 
of work to get there, they just want compliance.’  
5. DISCUSSION 
We conclude the substantive part of our article with a brief discussion of some of the key 
issues emerging from our research findings. This brief discussion highlights areas of 
concern and possible future courses of action.  
5.1 THE COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY CONTEXT 
The attitude of the practitioners to compliance with standards is an interesting finding 
given the focus on compliance in publications in the practitioner space.60 More generally, 
these are important findings for the way that information security is regulated. There may 
be issues with regulatory frameworks which place responsibility on information security 
practitioners to act as delegated regulators and ensure a certain level of compliance, where 
there is little actual connection between the community and the regulators, there is little 
understanding of legal and regulatory compliance obligations and there is limited 
understanding of the contested environment that information security practitioners operate 
in. 
 
In fact, one of the surprises from the research has been the absence of participant discussion 
about the legal requirements emanating from the Privacy Act. Given the Act is the primary 
source of information security legal obligation in Australia, we expected a much greater 
consideration and discussion of its application regarding the participants’ working lives. 
This certainly was not the case and only a small number of participants mentioned the 
Privacy Act at all and none of the participants seemed to regard it as a significant factor.  
 
As discussed above, PBR requires a closely engaged regulator to achieve clearly 
communicated outcomes and goals. There is little evidence of this from the interviews with 
participants and it was not possible to discern any sort of ongoing engagement between the 
OAIC based on the knowledge levels of participants. This is an important consideration. In 
theory, the principles adopted in a PBR framework should have the effect of shifting the 
responsibility for ensuring that the objectives of the principles are met from the regulator to 
the regulated, which in turn means that regulators must focus on the internal systems of 
management and control implemented by the regulated community. 
 
The significant lack of understanding about Privacy Act compliance may be representative 
of an unwillingness on the part of the regulator to accept responsibility for overseeing the 
internal information security management systems that would be required in a substantive 
                                                
60 See e.g. Arif Mohamed, Information security: The route to compliance (2007)  
<http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Information-security-The-route-to-compliance>; John 
Pavolotsky, Compliance Best Practices for Information Security: A Perspective (2011); SearchSecurity, The 




PBR system.61 Moreover, it is very questionable as to whether the OAIC has the requisite 
resources, skills and understanding to be able to regulate the operation of these internal 
information security systems in the way contemplated by a PBR framework and a 
compliance-based approach.62 As highlighted above, such a framework would require an 
active and highly engaged regulator that is driving an ongoing regulatory discourse.  
 
It may be that PBR coupled with a compliance regulatory approach is the best regulatory 
system for the protection of personal information and the resolution of competing rights 
that are often implicit in privacy issues. However, it is not clear that this regulatory system 
when considered in the context of the resources and skills available to the OAIC is best 
suited to supporting the adoption of better security practices by Australian organisations 
and the requirements of information security practitioners as delegated regulators.  
 
The extent that this is a study of potential regulatory failure in PBR frameworks is beyond 
the scope of this article but these are important issues that should be addressed further in 
the future. As regards the application of information security regulation, it is vital to 
determine whether in fact ‘light touch’ regulation results in ‘no touch’ understandings of 
the regulatory requirements expected of delegated regulators, in the form of information 
security practitioners.  
5.2 AN INFORMATION SECURITY PROFESSION? 
The fact that the information security practitioner group is so broad raises questions as to 
whether it is appropriate to group information security practitioners as a single group or 
profession. It may be that this single categorisation overly simplifies the differing roles of 
information security practitioners, obscuring the differences between them and making it 
difficult to identify the skills required for each of the different areas of competency. 
 
Although the nine interviewees had different definitions of information security, there 
seemed to be general consensus that information security can be regarded as preventing the 
organisation achieving its business goals. 
 
One interviewee said ‘information security is quite often considered probably as a road 
blocker.’ Another referred to a project that the security team became involved in where the 
security team ‘kept asking questions’ so that the business got upset and said that the 
security team were ‘being obstructionist and stuff. It all got quite toxic really for some time.’ 
C referred to how his team might sometimes be ‘too forceful’ when talking about 
information security. He said that often the ‘people taking their advice’ (being other 
internal teams), see that advice as a roadblock, which is not what is intended. Participant I 
said there was a need to get away from information security being seen as a ‘pain’ and 
                                                
61 See e.g. Jodie Signato and Mark Burdon, 'The Privacy Commissioner and Own-Motion Investigations into 
Serious Data Breaches: A Case of Going through the Motions?' (2015) 38(3) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 1145. 
62 Ibid, 1178. It should also be noted that the OAIC’s functions and resources have been severly cut back over 
the last two years. See for further details Richard Mulgan, 'The slow death of the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner', The Canberra Times (2015) <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-
service/the-slow-death-of-the-office-of-the-australian-information-commissioner-20150826-gj81dl.html>.  
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information security people as giving more pain, causing issues and making life more 
difficult.  
 
Notwithstanding the perception of information security as a road block, most of the 
interviewees saw their role as being to support the business or provide advice in a way that 
meant that security was seen as an enabler rather than a problem. One interviewee said he 
was not ‘in the game of saying, “No”’ but instead was interested in finding the best way to 
do something to have a business outcome.’ C described his team’s role as being about 
‘making sure that people understand that you are there to find a way to make something 
they want to do happen and not stop them.’ D talked about how the role of the information 
security team was ‘to enable business to do things’ in a secure way, not to make the 
business ‘put any activities on hold.’ Another said that the security team are not there to 
make life difficult for the business but to provide support. Rather than ‘taser-ing’ people 
who do not comply with security policies, one security team now sends ‘nicely-worded 
emails.’  
 
This focus on positioning information security as an enabler rather than a road-block 
represented a shift by information security practitioners and therefore skills need to be re-
considered for this more open approach to information security management. Overall, the 
findings from this research would suggest there is greater diversity amongst the 
practitioner community than currently thought, and there are opportunities to be gained 
from a better understanding of the diverse information security practitioner community. 
This diversity is much broader than the general differentiation between technical security 
practitioners and those with a management role which was referred to by a number of the 
participants, and perhaps also broader than existing workforce frameworks, such as the 
U.S. Cybersecurity Workforce Framework.63  
 
Other research has referred to the complexity and diversity of the information security 
workforce, concluding in particular that the cybersecurity workforce in the US is ‘too broad 
and diverse to be treated as a single occupation or profession.’64 If cybersecurity or 
information security policy development is to be truly effective, then it is necessary to 
determine whether the same applies in Australia.  
 
An extended study would help identify what the Australian information security 
community looks like, including the main positions, functions and roles of the range of 
information security practitioners working in Australia. Those findings could also be 
compared to the security community internationally, using existing studies.65 This might 
help identify both shared and singular characteristics of different information security 
communities and perhaps sign post future development directions for those communities. 
                                                
63 NIST, above n. 51. 
64 Committee on Professionalizing the Nation's Cybersecurity Workforce, Criteria for Future Decision-Making; 
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board; Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; National Research 
Council, Professionalizing the Nation’s Cybersecurity Workforce? Criteria for Decision Making (National Academies 
Press, 2013), Conclusion 2, 2. 
65 See for example Frost and Sullivan, above n. 54, 36 which uses 39 categories of job roles in IT security taken 
from industry frameworks developed throughout the world but with a focus on frameworks from the 
European Union and the USA’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), as well as constructs 
in use in the United Kingdom and Japan. 
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This in turn would provide the evidence base to devise and offer a range of diversified 
training and skills development programs as well as creating and supporting interest 
groups that more closely fit the needs of the range of members of the Australian 
community, including pertinent regulators. 
 
That said, it is important to note that the participants were either volunteers or people 
known to the researchers and comprised only a small sample of the information security 
community. Accordingly there may have been some gaps in terms of the skill sets of the 
people interviewed. For example, the interviewees did not include any person whose role 
might be regarded as within the “build” domain. This is one of the areas that should be 
addressed in future research.  
 
In addition, the interviewees came from a range of different organisations including 
medium sized consulting businesses, a large non for profit organisation, af state 
government body and a large financial institution. It is likely that the roles and 
responsibilities of the interviewees were influenced by the size of the organisation and the 
sector it operated in. The relationship between different organisation types, the sectors they 
operate in and the types of security functions carried out within those organisations is also 
an aspect of this research that may be worth pursuing further. Again, an understanding of 
how information security is actually actioned in different sectors could provide the 
opportunity to provide tailored offerings for those different sectors. 
 
5.3 FUTURE SKILLS? 
As discussed above, a deeper understanding of the needs of the Australian practitioner 
community is likely to support the identification of the broad range of skills required by 
Australian practitioners to cope with the new and changing environment they are dealing 
with. This in turn would inform the development of policy, training and education most 
important to that community. From our research, and from the other studies detailed 
above, it seems that the major activities of most information security practitioners involve 
management, communication and negotiation type activities. 
 
If this is the case then the main training needs for Australian information security 
practitioners (consistently with the recommendations from U.S. studies)66 need to be more 
oriented towards the development of practitioner behavioural, interpersonal and 
management skills including. Programs for the development of these ‘soft’ skills for its 
members would also address comments made about the overly technical focus of the 
existing information security associations, which was a common feature of participant 
concern. Similarly, a common problem and concern identified by the participants was the 
view that the business did not understand information security or information security risk 
and that it was difficult to engage with the business. Again, suitably equipping information 
security practitioners with appropriate skills would assist them to communicate more 
effectively with ‘business’ components of organisations. The ability to get the ‘message 
across’ about the importance of information security will also enhance the depth of 
                                                
66 Ibid. 
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regulatory dialogue and thus assist information security practitioners to become the 
delegated regulators required of them by Australia’s PBR framework.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Our findings have important implications for the ongoing development of information 
security regulation in Australia. We suggest that the effective regulation of information 
security, particularly in frameworks of delegated regulation, may have to be considered in 
a fundamentally different way. If information security practitioners are to be delegated 
regulators, they may need to be provided with a new skill set that enables them to 
adequately negotiate the complexities of information security regulation in a PBR 
environment. These skills are ‘soft’ in focus and orient towards processes of negotiation, 
conflict resolution and understanding institutional contexts. Building bigger and better 
controls is not the resolution here. In fact, such an approach may further isolate the security 
side from the business side in organisations. Furthermore, our research is not advanced 
enough to say whether our study is an example of the failure of Australia’s PBR 
framework. However, as with skills, perhaps a whole new range of regulatory tools are 
required to assist the dense discourse required between regulators and delegated regulators 
to clearly relate the context of regulation to information security practitioners.  
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